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I. INTRODUCTION 
Young athletes often dream of becoming the next star in their 
respective sports.1  A select few go on to realize that dream and become 
professional athletes.2  Within this group of superb athletes, there are a rare 
few who almost seem as though they were meant for the game, showing 
flashes of greatness at a young age.3  National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) superstar, LeBron James, was being touted as an elite player, 
drawing comparisons to the all-time greatKobe Bryantdespite still being 
a high school junior.4  Although the NBA has since amended its draft 
eligibility, the delay in going professional after high school is limited to one 
year.5  There still remains the possibility of basketball players profiting 
financially from their abilities immediately after high school graduation 
while foregoing college.6 
Baseball prospects are afforded an opportunity to enter the 
professional ranks, becoming draft eligible, immediately upon high school 
graduation.7  Similarly, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) allows 
players, age eighteen or older, to enter the draft.8 
Unlike these sports leagues, the National Football League (“NFL”) 
imposes a draft eligibility requirement stipulating that a prospective player 
1. See John Underwood, Does Herschel Have Georgia on His Mind?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 1, 1982, at 22, 22; NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF 
COMPETING IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS (2016), 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016RES_probability-chart-web-pdf_20160502.pdf. 
2. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22; NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1.
3. See Grant Wahl, Ahead of His Class, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 18, 2002,
at 62, 64. 
4. Id.
5. See NBA Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, 
http://www.draftsite.com/nba/rules/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
6. See Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A., Via Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at 1. 
7. MLB Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/mlb/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
8. NHL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nhl/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
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be at least three years removed from high school.9  Furthermore, these 
prospects are not afforded a realistic interim alternative to college that 
produces a monetary benefit.10  Essentially, the only legitimate path to 
becoming a professional football player begins by playing at the collegiate 
level.11  The problem arising from the disparity between the NFL draft 
eligibility requirements in comparison to the other Big Four American sports 
leagues is magnified by the average career spans of each sport’s athletes.12  
Professional football players in the NFL have the shortest career spans in 
comparison to players in the NBA, NHL, and Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”).13  As of 2013, NFL players average a full year less than the 
average NBA player, and two years less than NHL and MLB players.14  
Additionally, the NFL provides the lowest average player salary of the four 
major sports.15  This results in the lowest average potential earnings in what 
has been documented as an extremely violent sport that could potentially 
have dangerous long-term health effects.16 
Due to these draft eligibility restrictions, football prospects are 
forced to attend college in an attempt to showcase their talents to prospective 
employers in the NFL.17  Under the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) guidelines, these colleges essentially operate as a de facto farm 
system that guarantees the maturation and development of players at no cost 
to the NFL.18  There are some players that have been viewed as NFL-ready 
once they have graduated from high school.19  However, these players are 
9. NFL Draft Rules, DRAFTSITE.COM, http://www.draftsite.com/nfl/rules/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
10. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24; see also CFL Adjusts Eligibility Rules for
Draft, CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Sept. 06, 2013), http://www.cfl.ca/2013/09/06/cfl-
adjusts-eligibility-rules-for-draft/.  The CFL has more stringent eligibility standards than the 
NFL, requiring players to be from a Canadian school—CIS is the Canadian equivalent of 
NCAA—or having non-import status.  Id. 
11. Underwood, supra note 1, at 22.
12. See Nick Schwartz, The Average Career Earnings of Athletes Across
America’s Major Sports Will Shock You, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:07 AM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/10/average-career-earnings-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl-mls. 
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.; Jason M. Breslow, New:  87 Deceased NFL Players Test Positive
for Brain Disease, PBS: FRONTLINE (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/new-87-deceased-nfl-players-test-positive-for-
brain-disease/.  In a recent study about 87 out of 91 players tested positive for brain disease 
CTE.  Id. 
17. See NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9.
18. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24, 26.
19. Skip Bayless, Clarett Belonged in the NFL, ESPN.COM (Aug. 11, 2006),
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=bayless/060811; Jeff Legwold, Adrian Peterson 
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subjected to the threat of an injury that could negatively affect, or entirely 
eliminate, their earning potential due to the restrictive practices instituted by 
the NFL and NCAA.20  Despite the talents of a top prospect, an injury could 
potentially shrink the market for their services, as teams will be less willing 
to invest millions into a player who may never fully recover.21 
While in college, a football player is considered an amateur student-
athlete.22  The NCAA operates as a non-profit organization that promotes the 
academic and overall well-being of the student-athlete.23  Notwithstanding 
the threat of injury, a college football player must submit to the strict 
compensation restrictions imposed by the NCAA.24  A player who receives 
compensation for their athletic abilities or violates other provisions within 
the bylaws may be deemed ineligible to participate in all collegiate sports.25  
Since playing college football serves as the sole realistic option to obtaining 
employment for their athletic abilities, athletes are forced to accept a free 
education as compensation without protest.26  Furthermore, they must refrain 
from receiving any compensation that may be attributed to their athletic 
abilities.27  This restriction enables only the conference and school that the 
player attends to benefit financially from his or her talents.28  Although the 
NCAA prides itself on protecting the student aspect of the student-athlete 
label for college football players, it has hypocritically committed an act that 
the organization was originally founded to protect against:  exploitive athletic 
Among Few Who Could Make Leap from High School to NFL, ESPN.COM: NFL NATION (Oct. 
2, 2015), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/182078/adrian-peterson-among-
few-who-could-make-leap-from-high-school-to-nfl. 
20. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL art. 12.1.2.1 (2009); John Harris, 2016 NFL Draft:  Injury Crushes Draft Stock of 
Notre Dame LB Jaylon Smith, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2016/02/29/2016-nfl-draft-injury-crushes-
draft-stock-of-notre-dame-lb-jaylon-smith/; Mark Viera, Rutgers Player Is Paralyzed Below 
the Neck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at D1. 
21. See Harris, supra note 20.
22. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.01,
12.1. 
23. Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
24. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1.
25. Id.
26. See id. at art. 12.1.2.1, 15.1.
27. Id. at art. 12.1.
28. See id.; Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff:  Conference Payouts, BUS.
C. SPORTS (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.businessofcollegesports.com/2014/12/08/college-
football-playoff-conference-payouts/.  Over $50 million in revenue was distributed to each 
Power 5 conference for the 2014 through 2015 bowl season.  Dosh, supra. 
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practices.29  It is no secret that college football is a massive source of 
revenue for schools.30  However, these schools are operating under the guise 
of the NCAA’s core values, enabling them to use unfair bargaining power to 
obtain the services of football players without fair compensation.31  On 
average, college football players are less prepared academically to succeed in 
the classroom.32  If they are not able to maintain a certain grade point 
average, they may not only lose their scholarship, but also their ability to 
obtain employment in the NFL.33  There are similarities between a 
development league like the MLB minor league system and the college ranks 
of football.34  The most notable is the ability to develop talent to play at a 
professional level.35  However, a minor league prospect is able to 
simultaneously hone his or her skills while benefitting financially from these 
same talents, whereas a college football player must endure at least three 
years of schooling prior to receiving an opportunity to be compensated 
financially for his or her athletic prowess.36  Some student-athletes benefit 
from the education received from this arrangement.37  However, a substantial 
amount of college football players enter college with the sole intention of 
going to the NFL without obtaining a college degree.38 
                                                 
29. See Dosh, supra note 28; History, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://www.web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/connect
/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last visited Apr. 19, 
2017). 
30. See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances: 2014-15 Finances, USA 
TODAY, http://www.sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017); Dosh, 
supra note 28. 
31. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058–59 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
32. Doug Lederman, The Admissions Gap for Big-Time Athletes, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Dec. 29, 2008, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/12/29/admit.  “[C]ritics tend to argue that the 
colleges are doing a disservice to athletes who come in underprepared, and suggest that 
colleges may be achieving those higher graduation rates, in part, by directing athletes into less 
demanding academic programs . . . .”  Id. 
33. See Seth Soffian, College Sports:  Scholarships Not Four-Year 
Guarantees, NEWS-PRESS.COM (Oct. 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.news-
press.com/story/sports/college/fgcu/2015/10/16/college-sports-scholarships-not-four-year-
guarantees/74009542/. 
34. See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7. 
35. See Legwold, supra note 19; MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7. 
36. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12.1.2.1; 
MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7; NFL Draft Rules, supra note 9. 
37. See Christopher Bogan, 41% in NFL Graduate from College:  Rate in 
Pacific 10 Conference Only 38%, Report Shows, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1986), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1986-01-27/sports/sp-719_1_graduation-rate; Lederman, 
supra note 32. 
38. Bogan, supra note 37; see also Lederman, supra note 32. 
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This Comment will explain how the application of antitrust laws has 
affected previous sports related litigation.39  Furthermore, it will explain the 
rule of reason, a test courts have used to determine whether certain conduct 
falls within the purview of antitrust scrutiny.40  Subsequently, this Comment 
will apply the rule of reason to the deceptive practices engaged by the NFL 
and NCAA, revealing unreasonable labor market restrictions whilst 
debunking the previous litigation defenses used by both entities.41 
II. ANTITRUST LAWS
The Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is [hereby] declared to be 
illegal.”42  While the broad language of the Sherman Act may encompass 
almost any contract, the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
recognized that the Act is “intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints 
of trade.”43 
A. Labor Exemption 
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted primarily to “promote 
collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted employee” efforts 
including unionizing.44  Unfortunately, unions are inherently anticompetitive, 
as the “Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor 
organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a 
consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on 
differences in such standards.”45  By relinquishing individual rights to obtain 
an employment contract, employees are able to collectively benefit as a 
group in negotiations based on their strength in numbers.46  A sacrifice for 
the greater good can certainly be identified as anticompetitive.47  Labor 
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Section II.B.
41. See infra Part III.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
43. Id.; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984). 
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C.
McKinnon, Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule:  The Labor Exemption and the 
Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 383 (1984). 
45. McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383–84; see also United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965). 
46. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 384–85.
47. See id. at 383–85.
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negotiations such as standard wages may benefit some workers, but may be 
detrimental for others who may be able to command a higher wage based on 
experience or other factors.48  This ultimately leads to the conflict regarding 
whether agreements between employers and unions fall under antitrust 
scrutiny due to their inherent anticompetitive nature.49  After all, the 
Sherman Act was created “to promote freedom of competition in the 
marketplace.”50  Although agreements between employers and unions are 
considered to be restraints on trade, a “[[n]on-statutory exemption] generally 
applies when a union, acting with a non-labor party, seeks to attain goals 
which are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining under the National 
Labor Relations Act, unless the Union acts with a predatory anti-competitive 
purpose.”51  Mandatory subjects of bargaining have been defined as “wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”52 
B. Rule of Reason 
Since sports leagues consist of numerous competing teams, mutual 
agreements to have restraints on competition are necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the product.53  Therefore, it is likely that, while the rules of these 
leagues may constitute a per se violation, the appropriate rule to apply would 
be the rule of reason.54  The rule of reason test is comprised of three steps.55  
In the first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct has a 
substantial adverse effect on competition within a market.56  Second, the 
defendant must provide evidence that the challenged conduct promotes 
competition.57  Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there are 
substantially less restrictive means to achieve the procompetitive 
justifications provided by the defendant.58  After each side has presented its 
arguments on the issue, the court will apply a balancing test to determine 
whether the conduct presents an unreasonable restraint.59 
48. Id. at 384–85.
49. See id. at 385.
50. Id. at 383.
51. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004).
52. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). 
53. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
54. Id. at 1064.
55. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 1063.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1062.
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C. Litigation History Based on Labor Market Restraint in Sports 
Leagues 
1. The Spencer Haywood Rule
Spencer Haywood was a tremendous basketball prospect hailing 
from Detroit, Michigan.60  During his prep years, he won several prestigious 
accolades, including All-Detroit, All-Michigan, and All-American honors.61  
His success would continue after his graduation from high school in 1967.62  
At the collegiate level, he earned All-American honors during his lone 
seasons at Trinidad Junior College and the University of Detroit.63  More 
impressive was the fact that he was named Outstanding Player at the 
Olympic basketball games64 at the age of nineteen.65  At the age of twenty, 
he entered into a contract with the Denver Rockets of the American 
Basketball Association (“ABA”).66  His talents clearly transcended across 
every level of competition, as he would go on to be “named ‘Rookie of the 
Year,’ and ‘Most Valuable Player in the ABA’ for the 1969-70 [s]eason.”67 
After his rookie season, he signed a new contract with the Rockets 
but would later refuse to render services due to its fraudulent terms.68  Later 
that year, he signed with a NBA team, the Seattle Supersonics, despite a 
provision in the NBA bylaws that would deem him ineligible to play.69  
Haywood would then file claims against the NBA and its member teams for 
60. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1052
(C.D. Cal. 1971). 
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052; Scoop Jackson, It’s Time to Honor
Spencer Haywood’s Impact on Hoops and History, ESPN.COM (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/13627349/spencer-haywood-impact-hoops-history. 
One thing that will probably be overlooked in Spencer Haywood’s induction into 
the Basketball Hall of Fame . . . is the gift God gave him to play the game.  How, as 
a [twenty-one] year-old playing in the NBA, Haywood was a rarity.  How, at 
[nineteen] years old, he became the youngest American to make an Olympic 
basketball team. 
Jackson, supra. 
66. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1052.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1053–54.  “The contract does not provide for compensation for
Haywood’s services for six years in the amount of $1,900,000.  Compensation in excess of 
$394,000 is illusory and indefinite.”  Id. at 1053. 
69. Id. at 1054.  “At the time that Haywood contracted to play professional
basketball for Denver, the ABA had a four-year rule similar to that provided for in By-Law 
2.05 of NBA.  The ABA found that its four-year rule was a hardship on Haywood and waived 
it.”  Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1054. 
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engaging in an “unlawful conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.”70  Shortly following a decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to lift a stay on an injunction allowing 
him to play for his team,71 the NBA and Haywood would reach an out-of-
court settlement that allowed him to play for the Supersonics.72 
The argument in Haywood’s favor was that, as the sole wage 
earner in his struggling family, he was a hardship case and 
therefore had a right to begin earning his living. . . .  Beginning in 
1971, underclassmen were allowed to enter the NBA Draft 
provided they could give evidence of hardship to the NBA office.  
In 1976, the hardship requirement was eliminated in favor of the 
current Early Entry procedure, whereby any athlete with remaining 
college eligibility can enter the NBA Draft on the condition that he 
notifies the league office at least [forty-five] days before the 
draft.73 
Although the court did not ultimately rule on the draft eligibility 
rule, it provided insight into the court’s view on the restraint it created.74  The 
NBA provision at the time provided that: 
A person who has not completed high school or who has 
completed high school but has not entered college, shall not be 
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA] until four 
years after he has been graduated or four years after his original 
high school class has been graduated . . . .75 
The court determined that without an injunction, the rule would 
eliminate Haywood’s chances of playing basketball, at any level, for an 
                                                 
70. Id. at 1054. 
71. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1207 (1971); see also 
William C. Rhoden, Early Entry?  One and Done?  Thank Spencer Haywood for the 
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/sports/basketball/spencer-haywood-rule-nba-draft-
underclassmen.html. 
72. Rhoden, supra note 71. 
73. Spencer Haywood, NBA.COM, 
http://www.nba.com/history/players/haywood_bio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
74. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1056.  “There is a substantial 
probability in light of all the evidence presented to this [c]ourt that the so-called college draft . 
. . constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of Haywood and other 
potential NBA players to negotiate freely for the rendition of their services to NBA teams.”  
Id. 
75. Id. at 1055, 1058 (alteration in original) (stating that the conduct by the 
NBA “[was] in furtherance of . . . violations of the antitrust laws”). 
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entire year, because it would deem him ineligible to play in the NBA.76  
Furthermore, he was already ineligible to participate at the collegiate level.77  
This would certainly be a travesty, given the fact that Haywood had already 
proven that he could compete and dominate in the professional ranks.78  The 
court found that “[a] professional basketball player [had] a very limited 
career.”79 
If Haywood is unable to continue to play professional 
basketball for Seattle, he will suffer irreparable injury in that a 
substantial part of his playing career will have been dissipated, his 
physical condition, skills and coordination will deteriorate from 
lack of high-level competition, his public acceptance as a super 
star will diminish to the detriment of his career, his self-esteem 
and his pride will have been injured and a great injustice will be 
perpetrated on him.80 
The impact of this case can be felt still today, as underclassmen 
entering the draft has become commonplace.81  Although the NBA argued 
that the influx of young players would destroy the league and college 
basketball by “siphoning . . . talent from college basketball teams . . . 
[effectively] ruin[ing] the NBA’s pool of talent,”82 both entities are 
thriving.83 
76. See id. at 1057, 1060.
77. Id. at 1056.  Due to NCAA amateurism rules, Haywood would be
considered ineligible as he already signed and played for a professional team.  See Denver 
Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060–61. 
78. See Spencer Haywood, supra note 73.  Haywood led the league in scoring,
averaging 30 points a game and rebounding 19.5 rebounds per game while also winning the 
league’s Most Valuable Player.  Id. 
79. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057.
80. Id.
81. See Rhoden, supra note 71.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193467/total-league-
revenue-of-the-nba-since-2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  During the 2014–15 season the 
NBA posted revenue of 5.18 billion.  Total NBA League Revenue from 2001/02 to 2014/15 (in 
Billion U.S. Dollars), supra; Chris Isidore, Most Profitable NCAA Teams, CNN: MONEY 
(Mar. 16, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2015/03/16/news/companies/ncaa-
most-profitable/.  The Louisville Cardinals “posted $24 million in profits on [college 
basketball] revenue of about $40 million during the 2013–14 school year . . . .”  Isidore, supra. 
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2. Maurice Clarett 
Before his legal troubles, Maurice Clarett was a star in the making.84  
To this day, he is still arguably one of the best prep football players in Ohio’s 
prep football history.85  During his high school senior season, he amassed 
2194 rushing yards, a mind-blowing thirty-eight touchdowns, and was on his 
way to being named “USA Today National Offensive Player of the Year and 
Mr. Football.”86  In 2002, he would enroll at Ohio State University, 
becoming the first freshman running back to start for the school since 1943.87  
Standing at six feet tall and weighing two hundred and thirty pounds, he was 
already bigger than some of the NFL’s all-time great running backs.88  
During his freshman campaign, he set freshman rushing and touchdown 
records, while also providing an influential performance that resulted in Ohio 
State emerging victorious in the National Championship over favored 
Miami.89 
Close friend LeBron James was just finishing his senior season at St. 
Vincent-St. Mary when this was transpiring.90  After all the glory Clarett had 
brought to Ohio State, he still had to wait two more years to be draft-
eligible.91  To add insult to injury, James called Clarett to inform him of a 
massive, seven-year, $93 million deal with Nike before he had even been 
drafted.92  Being immersed in the luxuries that accompany a professional 
                                                 
84. See Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN.COM (Sept. 
18, 2006), http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204. 
85. Eric Frantz, Ohio’s Top 50 Athletes of the Decade:  No. 36 Maurice 
Clarett, JJHUDDLE.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.jjhuddle.com/2010/02/05/ohios-top-50-
athletes-of-the-decade-no-36-maurice-clarett/.  To cap his senior season, Clarett rushed for 
785 yards and eight touchdowns in the playoffs—in three games.  Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, supra note 84. 
88. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  “Clarett . . . is taller and heavier than some of the NFL’s all-time greatest running 
backs, including Walter Payton—5’10”, 200, Barry Sanders—5’8”, 203, and Emmitt Smith—
5’9”, 207.”  Id. 
89. See Frantz, supra note 85; Timeline:  The Rise and Fall of Maurice 
Clarett, supra note 84. 
90. See Pablo S. Torre, Lost Stories of Lebron, Part 2, ESPN.COM, 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/9825057/lebron-james-maurice-clarett-were-fellow-ohio-
natives-drastically-different-futures-espn-magazine (last updated October 19, 2013, 10:13 
AM).  The Ohioans were “born one year and [fifty] miles of I-76 apart”—James hailing from 
Akron, and Clarett from Youngstown.  Id. 
91. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Torre, supra note 90. 
92. Torre, supra note 90.  Clarett was often with James during James’ rise to 
fame.  Id.  This included meeting numerous celebrities.  Id.  (“There was the time they hung 
out with Jay Z backstage.  There was the time they attended a party in Cleveland and Biz 
11
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career, Clarett fell victim to wanting compensation for his athletic 
achievements as well.93  “Clarett sa[id] he was intoxicated by being a 
somebody.  And, if [you are] a somebody, you want to be around another 
somebody.”94  NFL executives commenting about Clarett’s status as a NFL 
caliber player, despite not being eligible, certainly boosted his ego as well.95  
Before his sophomore season, Clarett was suspended for the entire season 
“for accepting thousands of dollars in illicit extra benefits,” coupled with 
allegations of academic fraud.96  Unable to play at the collegiate level for a 
year and not wanting his skills to diminish from inactivity, Clarett decided to 
challenge the NFL’s draft eligibility rule that mandated a player be three 
years removed from high school.97 
a. Clarett:  Circuit Court of Appeals Reversal 
A district court ruled in Maurice Clarett’s favor in Clarett v. 
National Football League (“Clarett I”),98 holding that the NFL’s eligibility 
rules were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws.99  
On appeal, the court reversed the ruling.100  The stark difference between 
these two rulings was that the appellate court found that the eligibility rule 
was afforded non-statutory exemption status from antitrust scrutiny, whereas 
the district court did not.101  In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,102 the Supreme 
Court of the United States provided that although a collectively bargained 
provision may be a mandatory bargaining subject, it should be examined by 
                                                                                                                   
Markie deejayed.  There was the time Clarett traded numbers with Snoop Dogg, who knew the 
tailback from controlling him on PlayStation.”).  Id. 
93. See id. 
94. Torre, supra note 90. 
95. See Bob Glauber, Clarett Sues NFL for Right to Enter Draft, NEWSDAY 
(Sept. 23, 2003, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/clarett-sues-nfl-for-right-to-enter-
draft-1.399287.  “If Clarett is deemed eligible for the draft, it [is] likely he would be a first-
round choice, according to several league executives . . . .  ‘I [am] sure someone would take a 
chance on him,’ one NFL personnel director said.”  Id. 
96. Rusty Miller, Clarett Suspended for 2003 Season for 16 NCAA Violations, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2003, 2:36 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2003-09-10-clarett-
suspension_x.htm; see also Mike Freeman, When Values Collide:  Clarett Got Unusual Aid in 
Ohio State Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at SP1. 
97. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
98. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
99. Id. at 410–11. 
100. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). 
101. Compare Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 138, with Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 
397. 
102. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
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balancing the “interests of union members” served by the restraint against 
“its relative impact on the product market,” before being granted exemption 
status.103 
The court reasoned: 
[T]o permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that 
their concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market 
would seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by 
these [federal] labor laws, including the congressional policy 
favoring collective bargaining, the bargaining parties’ freedom of 
contract, and the widespread use of multi-employer bargaining 
units.104 
Rather than determine the impact on the product market in 
accordance with the test formulated by Justice White, the court provided 
support for the power of unions and their importance in the labor law 
relations.105  Additionally, they found that “the eligibility rules constitute a 
mandatory bargaining subject because they have tangible effects on the 
wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”106  This Comment 
will further examine those tangible effects in Part B.107 
3. O’Bannon Case
Ed O’Bannon was a former All-American basketball player at the 
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) who was informed by a 
friend that his likeness was being used in a video game.108  In 2009, 
O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”) 
in O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon I”),109 claiming “that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules [prohibited] . . . student-athletes from [receiving] 
103. Id. at 261.  The court agreed with Justice White’s approach “[w]hen 
confronted with allegations that agreements between labor and employers damaged 
competition in the business or product market, we have previously regarded Justice White’s 
decision in Jewel Tea as setting forth the ‘classic formulation’ of the non-statutory 
exemption.”  Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 132 n.12 (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)). 
104. Id. at 135. 
105. See id. at 132, 138–39.  “The players union’s representative possesses 
‘powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the 
rights of those whom it represents.’”  Id. at 139. 
106. Id. at 140. 
107. See infra Section III.B.2. 
108. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 277 (2016). 
109. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
13
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compensat[ion] for the use of their [name, image, and likeness].”110  
Meanwhile, Sam Keller, a former college quarterback filed a separate suit 
against the NCAA, CLC, and Electronic Arts (“EA”), “a software company 
that produced video games based on college football and men’s basketball 
from the late 1990s until around 2013.”111  The two cases were consolidated, 
receiving class certification.112  After the plaintiffs settled their claims with 
EA and CLC, the cases were deconsolidated, and in 2014, the antitrust 
claims against the NCAA went to trial before the district court.113  The 
district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the NCAA’s rules 
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their name, 
image, and likeness violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.114  On appeal, the 
NCAA asserted that because the NCAA court held amateur rules valid, any 
challenge to them must fail.115  Rather than categorically approving all 
amateurism rules, the NCAA explained why its rules should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.116  Although the opinion on amateurism served as 
mere dicta, the O’Bannon I court held high regard for its contents.117  
Summarily, despite amateurism rules serving a procompetitive purpose, it 
“can . . . be invalid[ated] under the rule of reason if a substantially less 
restrictive rule would further the same objectives equally well.”118  The 
appellate court’s decision “reaffirm[ed] that NCAA regulations are subject to 
antitrust scrutiny and must be tested in the crucible of the [r]ule of 
[r]eason.”119 
110. Id. at 1055. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1056. 
114. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056; see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
115. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
116. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1062–63; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
468 U.S. at 113–20. 
117. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.  “To be sure, ‘[w]e do not treat considered 
dicta from the Supreme Court lightly;’ such dicta should be accorded appropriate deference.”  
Id. (alteration in original). 
118. Id. at 1063–64. 
119. Id. at 1079.  “[T]he NCAA is not above the antitrust laws, and courts 
cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA to play by the Sherman Act’s rules.” 
Id. 
14
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III. NFL AND NCAA RESTRAINT ON LABOR MARKET
It can be argued that football, and not baseball, is America’s true 
national pastime.120  Despite the violence of the sport, its media appeal has 
helped the sport grow tremendously.121  Colleges and NFL teams profit from 
the services of a distinct individuala football player.122  The demarcation 
of college football players and professional football players are monotonous 
when the horrifying possibility of permanent injury is a common threat faced 
on any play.123  Yet, these college football players subject their bodies to this 
threat for a hopeful financial reward.124  Given the rise in player contract 
values,125 or the huge investments into athletic facilities by colleges to lure 
recruits,126 the market for football players’ services is ever-growing.  As 
fans’ demands grow, so too does the supply.127  In 2008, ESPN agreed to pay 
the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) “a staggering $2.25 billion over the 
120. See Lucy McCalmont, Football Has Taken Over Baseball as the True 
National Pastime, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/football-national-pastime_n_7078660.html. 
121. Id. 
It has been a long, long time since baseball was truly America’s pastime, 
and it has nothing to do with anything baseball has done wrong.  It has been since . 
. . television. . . .  The NFL is terrific to watch on television in a way baseball [is 
not] and never was, and we are a nation of television watchers.  The minute people 
realized how easy football was to follow on television—even if it really tells you 
very little of [what is] actually going on—was the minute baseball stopped being 
America’s pastime. 
Id. 
122. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish 
Athletic Facilities, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2015, 6:40 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222-
story.html. 
123. See Viera, supra note 20, at D1. 
124. See id.; Adam Schefter & Jeff Legwold, Broncos Sign Von Miller for 6 
Years; Deal Worth $114.5M, Sources Say, ESPN.COM (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17084231/denver-broncos-von-miller-agree-6-year-1145-
million-deal. 
125. See Schefter & Legwold, supra note 123. 
126. Hobson & Rich, supra note 121. 
Big-time college athletic departments are taking in more money than 
ever—and spending it just as fast.  A decade of rampant athletics construction 
across the country has redefined what it takes to field a competitive top-tier college 
sports program.  Football stadiums and basketball arenas now must be 
complemented by practice facilities, professional-quality locker rooms, players’ 
lounges with high-definition televisions and video game systems, and luxury suites 
to coax more money from boosters. 
Id. 
127. See ACC, ESPN Partner for New Conference Channel, ESPN.COM (July 
18, 2016), http://www.espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/17102933/acc-espn-agree-20-
year-rights-deal-lead-2019-launch-acc-network. 
15
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next [15] years—about $150 million a year—for the conference’s TV 
rights.”128  More recently, Mercedes-Benz purchased the naming rights to a 
newly constructed NFL stadium for $1.4 billion.129  This is all driven by the 
on-field product provided by these football players.130 
A. NCAA 
Due to the NFL’s draft eligibility rules, it is common practice for a 
football prospect to play at the collegiate level prior to becoming a 
professional.131  In fact, colleges serve as a de facto development league for 
the NFL.132  The NFL is grateful for the financial rewards of having colleges 
as a supplier of premier football services.133  Although both the NFL and 
NCAA may identify as competitors providing similar products, they both 
benefit financially from practices that unreasonably restrain the market for 
football players.134  This is possible because of their firm control on the 
market for the players’ services.135 
128. Michael Smith & John Ourand, ESPN Pays $2.25B for SEC Rights, 
SPORTS BUS. J. (Aug. 25, 2008), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2008/08/20080825/This-Weeks-
News/ESPN-Pays-$225B-For-SEC-Rights.aspx. 
129. Tim Tucker, Falcons Officially Announce Mercedes-Benz as Naming 
Rights Partner, AJC.COM (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/falcons-officially-announce-mercedes-benz-as-
namin/nnP9Y/. 
130. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 22. 
131. See id. at 22–23; NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5. 
132. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
133. See id. 
134. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062 
(9th Cir. 2015) cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. 
Supp. 2d 379, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
135. Michael Janofsky, U.S.F.L. Loses in Antitrust Case; Jury Assigns Just $1 
in Damages, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/30/sports/usfl-
loses-in-antitrust-case-jury-assigns-just-1-in-damages.html.  Despite losing, the U.S.F.L. 
succeeded in proving that the NFL was a monopoly.  Id.; see also United States v. Walters, 
997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
The NCAA depresses athletes’ income—restricting payments to the value of 
tuition, room, and board, while receiving services of substantially greater worth.  
The NCAA treats this as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced 
eye would see it as the use of monopsony power to obtain athletes’ services for less 
than the competitive market price. 
Walters, 997 F.2d at 1225. 
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1. Amateurism 
Founded in 1906, the NCAA sought out to remedy the problem that 
was being created by colleges competing for the best players.136  In doing so, 
“one of [its] earliest reforms . . . was a requirement that . . . participants be 
amateurs.”137  To maintain amateurism, a student-athlete must not receive 
compensation other than what is permitted by the NCAA.138  Even then, the 
compensation received was insufficient.139  In 2014, the NCAA finally 
allowed scholarships to be awarded up to the full cost of attendance.140  In 
addition to the compensation rules, the NCAA adopted several other 
amateurism protecting rules that restrain the market for football players’ 
services.141  An amateur may lose their eligibility to play at the collegiate 
level if they sign a contract with a professional team, enter a professional 
league’s player draft, or hire an agent.142  Additionally, the NCAA generally 
limits the mobility of an athlete by imposing a transfer penalty, mandating 
that a transferring athlete sit-out one season immediately after transferring 
before being eligible to play.143  This can potentially affect an athlete’s 
ability to market themselves to the future purchasers of their services, the 
NFL.144 
Players, however, suffer a severe penalty for 
transferring—the loss of a year of athletics eligibility.  This can 
make them a very unattractive option for coaches who are under 
constant win now pressure.  The NCAA’s transfer rules restrain 
players’ ability to make the best choices for themselves, including 
                                                 
136. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054; History, supra note 29. 
137. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. 
138. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2. 
139. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054. 
The cost of attendance at a particular school includes the items that make up a grant 
in aid plus ‘[nonrequired] books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses 
related to attendance at the institution.’  The difference between a grant in aid and 
the cost of attendance is a few thousand dollars at most schools. 
Id. at 1054 n.3 (alteration in original). 
140. Id. at 1054–55. 
141. Id. at 1055. 
142. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2. 
143. Joe Nocera, With College Transfer Rules, Hypocrisy Never Sits Out a 
Year, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/sports/ncaabasketball/with-college-transfer-rules-
hypocrisy-never-sits-out-a-year.html; see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1. 
144. See Nocera, supra note 143; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 14 § 14.5.1. 
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ones based on financial considerations, academic considerations, 
athletics considerations, and personal circumstances.145 
However, the most important rule prohibits athletes—with a few 
exceptions—from receiving, either direct or indirect, payment for their 
athletic skill.146 
The NCAA, with varying success, has used the defense that all 
amateurism rules are legally valid.147  Recently, O’Bannon I provided a 
clearer depiction of the intent in the NCAA v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma148 case, holding that not all rules that are linked to 
amateurism were immune from antitrust scrutiny.149 
2. Rule of Reason Application to Amateurism Rules
The NCAA’s bylaws applying to amateurism may be afforded 
antitrust scrutiny due to their effect on commerce.150  “[T]he modern legal 
understanding of commerce is broad, ‘including almost every activity from 
which the actor anticipates economic gain.’”151  “Despite the nonprofit status 
145. Steve Berkowitz, Lawsuit Challenges Rule for Transfers Between NCAA 
Division I Football Schools, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:44 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/03/08/lawsuit-ncaa-division-football-
transfer-rules-peter-deppe-iowa-hawkeyes-northern-illinois-huskies/81510022/; see also 
Nocera, supra note 143. 
[T]he case of Baker Mayfield, the Sooners’ current quarterback, who walked on to 
the Texas Tech team as a freshman, then transferred to Oklahoma, where he walked 
on to its football team, too.  Mayfield not only had to sit out a year but also lost a 
year of eligibility because of a Big 12 rule that punishes players who dare to move 
to a different college within the conference.  The fact that Mayfield [did not] have 
an athletic scholarship made no difference. 
Nocera, supra note 143. 
146. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 20, at art. 12 § 12.1.2.1.  “[M]ost importantly, an athlete is prohibited—with few 
exceptions—from receiving any pay based on his athletic ability, whether from boosters, 
companies seeking endorsements, or would-be licensors of the athlete’s name, image, and 
likeness, NIL.”  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original). 
147. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.  “Quoting heavily from the language in 
Board of Regents that we have emphasized, the NCAA contends that any Section 1 challenge 
to its amateurism rules must fail as a matter of law because the Board of Regents Court held 
that those rules are presumptively valid.”  Id.; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
148. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
149. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 
120. 
150. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065. 
151. Id.; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 340 
(7th Cir. 2012).  “No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college 
18
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of NCAA member schools, the transactions those schools make with premier 
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not 
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of 
these transactions.”152  Student-athletes considering scholarship offers often 
weigh economic factors, such as the earning potential of a degree or the 
likelihood of entering the NFL.153  Therefore, the transactions that take place 
between the NCAA and student-athletes are somewhat commercial in 
nature.154 
“In December 2010, the Buckeyes suspended star quarterback 
Terrelle Pryor,” and four other players “for the first five games of the 2011 
season for selling memorabilia and receiving discounted services at a local 
tattoo parlor.”155  “Pryor sold his 2008 Big Ten championship ring, Fiesta 
Bowl sportsmanship award,” and other personal items.156  “He was ordered 
to repay a total of $2500.”157  This punishment seems counterintuitive to the 
promotion of capitalism to prevent anyone from profiting from his or her 
own hard work in any capacity.158 
a. Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market
There is a market for football players’ services, in which some 
football players are the reluctant sellersand the schools are the 
purchasersof their “athletic services and licensing rights.”159  The NCAA 
thus operates as a monopsony,160 in that it is the only purchaser of this 
particular good for a reserved population of football players.161  
Consequently, price-fixing occurs when the compensation awarded to 
football programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not 
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program.”  Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340. 
152. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340; see also Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
153. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341. 
154. Id. 
155. Zach Dirlam, Scandal at Ohio State (Part 1 of 5):  The Tattooed Five and 
Tressel’s Cover Up, BLEACHER REP. (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/719411-scandal-at-ohio-state-part-1-of-5-the-tattooed-
five-tressels-cover-up. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Kevin Trahan, How the NCAA’s Marxist Philosophy is Hurting its 
Athletes, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevintrahan/2014/08/18/how-the-ncaa-hurts-the-players-it-
claims-to-protect/. 
159. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 991 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
160. Id. 
161. See id. 
19
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student-athletes is limited to the grant-in-aid provided by the school, despite 
the level of talent.162  The students have no bargaining power.163  Likewise, 
the schools cannot exceed the compensation awarded without facing 
penalty.164  However, due to the same rule, the schools still have another 
profitable venture in which they have no competition—the licensing rights of 
their players.165  Although the NCAA prohibits the use of a student-athlete’s 
name, image, or appearance to promote commercial ventures,166 it is able to 
profit from student-athletes through disingenuous means.167 
Throughout college stadiums, fans don the jerseys of their favorite 
players.168  Every year, a portion of the revenue from different programs 
across the nation can be attributed to jersey sales.169  Although a student-
athlete cannot sell his or her own personal belongings attributable to their 
athletic ability, a school can sell a replica jersey of that same player under the 
facade that it does not reflect the player’s likeness or image simply because 
their name is missing from the jersey.170  This thinking is pure lunacy.171  The 
162. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016).  “The ‘combination[s] 
condemned by the [Sherman] Act’ also include ‘price-fixing . . . by purchasers’ even though 
‘the persons specially injured . . . are sellers, not customers or consumers.’”  Id. at 1070 
(alteration in original). 
163. Nicolas A. Novy, “The Emperor Has No Clothes”:  The NCAA’s Last 
Chance as the Middle Man in College Athletics, 21 SPORTS LAW. J. 227, 232 (2014). 
164. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 § 
16.01.1; Eric Dodds, The ‘Death Penalty’ and How the College Sports Conversation Has 
Changed, TIME (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.time.com/3720498/ncaa-smu-death-penalty/. 
SMU infamously violated several NCAA rules, by providing illegal compensation for recruits 
to attend the university.  Dodds, supra.  The NCAA imposed what was dubbed the death 
penalty, with sanctions including the program being banned from bowl games and stripped of 
forty-five scholarships for two years.  Id.  “There[] [is] a reason that a popular sports joke in 
the early ‘80s was that [Eric] Dickerson took a pay-cut when he graduated and went to the 
NFL.”  Id. 
165. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 31 § 
31.6.4.2. 
166. Id. at art. 12.5.1.1. 
167. Joseph Milord, It’s All Profit and No Pay:  How the NCAA is an Ingenious 
Business, ELITE DAILY (Mar. 20, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.elitedaily.com/money/ncaa-
ingenious-business-ever-created-tuesday/. 
168. See Novy, supra note 163, at 237. 
169. See id. at 236; Milord, supra note 167; Marc Tracy, Days of Selling 
Popular College Players’ Jerseys Seems Numbered, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/sports/ncaafootball/days-of-selling-popular-college-
players-jerseys-seem-numbered.html. 
170. Novy, supra note 163, at 236–37; Milord, supra note 167; Tracy, supra 
note 169. 
171. See Kevin Trahan, Long Past Time for College Football Teams to Stop 
Selling Real Player Jerseys, SB NATION (June 5, 2014, 2:23 PM), 
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number 23 is forever linked to Michael Jordan, just like any other sports 
hero’s number will be forever tied to that team.172  If we are to believe that 
jersey numbers are ambiguous representations of the school themselves and 
not the player, then why do schools retire a revered student-athlete’s number, 
a la professionals?173  It is evident that this practice presents an 
anticompetitive arrangement that allows only the school to profit from the 
marketability of their athletes.174  Even so, schools still use their current 
student-athletes likeness in a commercial setting.175  Meanwhile, players are 
subjected to watch as schools reap the financial reward from their services, 
while they are unable to receive a breadcrumb for their efforts.176 
b. Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition
While the courts have generally recognized the importance of 
maintaining the amateurism aspect of the college football product,177 they 
have also determined “that the NCAA’s definition of amateurism [is] 
malleable, changing frequently over time in ‘significant and contradictory 
ways.’”178  The NCAA’s current rules do serve a procompetitive benefit by 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/5/5783202/college-football-player-jerseys-
real-numbers. 
172. See Maureen Callahan, Jeter’s Retirement Marks End of Yanks’ Single-
Digit Numbers, N.Y. POST (Mar. 30, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/03/30/jeters-
retirement-marks-end-of-yanks-single-digit-numbers/; Tracy, supra note 169.  “The Yankees 
will hit another milestone this season besides the retirement of Derek Jeter:  [It is] the last time 
a single-digit jersey will be worn by a Bronx Bomber.”  Callahan, supra.  The Yankees are 
famous for not displaying player names on their uniform.  See id. 
173. See Craig Barnes, Seminoles to Retire Deion’s Number Tonight, SUN 
SENTINEL (Oct. 7, 1995), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-10-
07/sports/9510060566_1_doak-campbell-stadium-sanders-charlie-ward. 
174. See Tracy, supra note 169; Trahan, supra note 171.  “Worried about the 
ramifications of selling the numbers tied to student-athletes, several schools have decided not 
to sell football jerseys with star players names on it this upcoming season, sources tell ESPN.”  
Trahan, supra note 171. 
175. Jason Kirk, NCAA President Faces Fact That Colleges Sell Jerseys with 
Real Player Numbers, SB NATION (June 20, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/6/20/5827802/ncaa-player-jerseys-numbers-
mark-emmert-obannon.  During the O’Bannon case, “Georgia Tech tweeted an image of 
football schedule cards, each with a current [player] posed next to a corporate sponsor’s logo.”  
Id.  Although the schedules were handed out by the school, and not sold, the presence of 
commercial sponsors implies a mutual partnership that financially benefits both parties, 
through advertising.  See id. 
176. See Novy, supra note 163, at 228. 
177. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
178. Id. at 1058. 
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promoting amateurism, which helps drive the consumer’s demand for the 
product that is college football.179  However, studies have shown that these 
rules “do not promote competitive balance” amongst football programs.180  
In fact, “restrictions on student-athlete compensation lead many schools . . . 
to spend larger portions of their athletic budgets on coaching, recruiting, and 
training facilities.”181  It is hard to argue that competitive balance is a true 
driving force, with the increasing number of bowl games awarded to 
teams.182 
The number of bowls has doubled in the last [twenty] years and [it 
is] unknown if there will even be enough teams to fill the slots.  In 
order to qualify for a bowl game, teams must win at least six 
games, but a [five-seven] team can fill out a waiver to play for an 
available slot.183 
To fulfill consumers’ insatiable demand for football, the NCAA has 
capitalized on the time period when the NFL season is dwindling down to 
steadily increase the number of games available to the market.184  It is 
The court suggested that, even today, the NCAA’s definition of amateurism is 
inconsistent:  [A]lthough players generally cannot receive compensation other than 
scholarships, tennis players are permitted to accept up to $10,000 in prize money 
before enrolling in college, and student-athletes are permitted to accept Pell grants 
even when those grants raise their total financial aid package above their cost of 
attendance.  It thus concluded that amateurism was not, in fact, a core principle[] of 
the NCAA. 
Id. at 1058–59 (citations omitted). 
179. Id. at 1059. 
180. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
[S]ince the 1970s, numerous sports economists have studied the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules and nearly all have concluded that the rules have no discernible 
effect on the level of competitive balance. . . .  [Also], a 2007 study by economist 
Jim Peach published in the Social Science Journal, found that there is ‘little 
evidence that the NCAA rules and regulations have promoted competitive balance 
in college athletics and no a priori reason to think that eliminating the rules would 
change the competitive balance situation.’ 
Id. 
181. Id. 
The fact that high-revenue schools are able to spend freely in these other areas 
cancels out whatever leveling effect the restrictions on student-athlete pay might 
otherwise have.  The NCAA does not do anything to rein in spending by the high-
revenue schools or minimize existing disparities in revenue and recruiting. 
Id. at 97879. 
182. See Nick Schwartz & Laken Litman, Are There Too Many College 
Football Bowl Games?, USA TODAY (May 6, 2015, 3:11 PM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/05/are-there-too-many-college-football-bowl-games. 
183. Id.  “Playing in a bowl game used to be a reward.  Now [it is] getting 
overly commercial and out of control.”  Id. 
184. See id. 
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apparent that this is mainly commercially driven based on the astounding 
profits from bowl games, despite the dilution of competition.185 
Although the NCAA promotes a product that is unique from the 
NFL, and amateurism is an integral component of that product, student-
athlete compensation is not the driving force behind consumer demand for its 
product.186  “Dr. Emmert, [the NCAA commissioner], himself noted that 
much of the popularity of the NCAA’s annual men’s basketball tournament 
stems from the fact that schools from all over the country participate ‘so the 
fan base has an opportunity to cheer for someone from their region of the 
country.’”187 
The NCAA has also argued that the restraints on student-athlete 
compensation integrates athletics and academics, and promotes competition 
for football players’ services by increasing the quality of the educational 
services its member schools provide to student-athletes.188  Contrarily, one of 
the NCAA’s expert witnesses in the O’Bannon v. NCAA (“O’Bannon II”)189 
case, Dr. James Heckman, “testified that the long-term educational and 
academic benefits that student-athletes enjoy stem from their increased 
access to financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured 
schedules, and other educational services that are unrelated to the 
[compensation] rules.”190  It is well documented how schools exploit the 
talents of student-athletes while shuffling them through the education 
185. See Dosh, supra note 28.  An increase in bowl games from thirty-five 
games in 2014 to thirty-nine in 2015, resulted in a $196 million increase in revenue.  College 
Bowl Payouts Surpass $500 Million, ESPN.COM (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/12688517/college-bowl-game-payouts-
surpass-500-million-first-year-college-football-playoff.  Surprisingly, schools’ expenses in 
relation to the revenue declined more than ten percent over this span.  See id. 
186. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).  “[C]onsumers are primarily attracted to 
college sports for reasons unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or 
affinity for the school in their region of the country.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
187. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
188. Id. at 980. 
189. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
190. Id. at 980. 
The only evidence that the NCAA has presented that suggests that its 
challenged rules might be necessary to promote the integration of academics and 
athletics is the testimony of university administrators, who asserted that paying 
student-athletes large sums of money would potentially create a wedge between 
student-athletes and others on campus.  These administrators noted that, depending 
on how much compensation was ultimately awarded, some student-athletes might 
receive more money from the school than their professors.  Student-athletes might 
also be inclined to separate themselves from the broader campus community by 
living and socializing off campus. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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system.191  Recently, before a Congressional Committee, Myron Rolle, a 
former football player and Rhodes Scholar at Florida State University, “said 
that many universities [do not] prioritize an athlete’s education, rendering the 
term student-athlete inaccurate.”192 
Calling himself an anomaly, Rolle, who was a Rhodes 
Scholar, said the number of hours occupied by games, traveling, 
workouts, injury treatments, and practices left little time for 
studying.  With so few athletes continuing their sport after college, 
he said, many students do not have much to show for their work 
upon graduation.193 
A 1980s study done by Northeastern University showed the sad state 
of educational affairs for prep athletes, placing “the functional illiteracy rate 
for . . . high school football and basketball players at 25[%} to 30[%], twice 
the national average.”194 
Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star, testified that he felt 
like “‘an athlete masquerading as a student’ during his college years.”195  A 
1986 study revealed that roughly six out of every ten NFL players did not 
have a college degree.196  Though players’ early departure to the league may 
have contributed to this statistic, several were ill-equipped to thrive in an 
academic setting anyhow.197  Couple this with the rigorous demands the sport 
191. See id. at 975, 984. 
192. Paul Cottle, Former FSU Football Star Tells Congressional Committee 
About College Athletes:  “A Lot of Them Would Go Through this Academic Machinery and 
Get Spit Out, Left Torn, Worn, and Asking Questions.” BRIDGE TO TOMORROW (July 10, 
2014), https://bridgetotomorrow.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/former-fsu-football-star-tells-
congressional-committee-about-college-athletes-a-lot-of-them-would-go-through-this-
academic-machinery-and-get-spit-out-left-torn-worn-and-asking-questions/ (emphasis added). 
“‘Many of my fellow teammates struggled in that environment,’ Rolle said.  ‘Some of them 
sent some of their scholarship money home to help their families.  They struggled 
academically.  A lot of them would go through this academic machinery and get spit out, left 
torn, worn, and asking questions.’”  Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Diana Nyad, How Illiteracy Makes Athletes Run, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1989, at S8.  Former NFL and Oklahoma State football player, Dexter Manley, was a 
functioning illiterate, but somehow was accepted into and studied at the school for four years. 
Id. 
195. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980–81. 
196. Bogan, supra note 37. 
197. See Lederman, supra note 32.  The Atlanta Journal Constitution 
conducted a study of admission reports for fifty-four colleges between 1990 and 2006.  Id.  
There was a noticeable difference between football players’ average SAT score when 
compared to the average SAT score of a non-athlete incoming student.  Id. 
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requires,198 and football players are left with little time to realistically focus 
on the education aspect that the NCAA vehemently declares is a core 
value.199 
B. NFL 
The NFL’s draft eligibility rule is not foreign to antitrust suits.200  
However, they have escaped antitrust scrutiny due to the non-statutory 
exemption that promotes a national labor policy favoring free and private 
collective bargaining and requiring good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, 
and working conditions.201  The NFL and its player union negotiated the 
current collective bargaining agreement that includes the agreed upon 
eligibility rules.202  While the National Labor Relations Act was enacted 
primarily “to promote collective bargaining and to protect . . . concerted 
employee” efforts,203 eligibility rules that regulate commercial activity 
certainly create a restraint on trade.204 
The mere fact that a rule can be characterized as an eligibility rule, 
however, does not mean the rule is not a restraint of trade; were 
the law otherwise, the NCAA could insulate its member schools’ 
relationships with student-athletes from antitrust scrutiny by 
198. See Chris Isidore, Playing College Sports:  A Long, Tough Job, CNN 
MONEY (Mar. 31, 2014, 6:58 AM), 
http://www.money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/news/companies/college-athletes-jobs/. 
Up until the season starts, the workload trails off to [fifty] to [sixty] 
hours a week.  That eases to [forty] to [fifty] hours a week once the season, and 
classes, begin.  Weeks with road games include a [thirty-seven] hour stretch that 
includes travel, practice, a [three] to [four] hour game and some time to sleep in a 
strange hotel. 
The season usually runs until late November—unless the team is 
successful.  Then it has to work through to a bowl game, sometimes played on New 
Year’s Day.  There might be a brief break for the holidays, but, as the NLRB found, 
‘While the players are allowed to leave campus for several days before Christmas, 
they must report back by Christmas morning.’ 
Id. 
199. Finances, supra note 23. 
200. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). 
201. Id. at 130.  “[F]ederal labor statutes . . . delegate related rulemaking and 
interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.”  Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 
518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996). 
202. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126–27. 
203. McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 383. 
204. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016). 
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renaming every rule governing student-athletes an eligibility 
rule.205 
The broad scope in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
determined whether an employer-union agreement could be afforded 
exemption status, was announced in Justice White’s opinion “advocat[ing] 
that the application of the non-statutory exemption should be determined by 
balancing the ‘interests of union members’ served by the restraint against ‘its 
relative impact on the product market.’”206  Even so, there is ongoing debate 
regarding the boundaries of the exemption and what test to apply in 
determining whether a rule is truly a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.207 
1. Dispelling the Mandatory Bargaining Subject Ruling of Clarett
In an age in which player safety has come to the forefront for issues 
involving the sport, it seems counterintuitive to restrain the labor market 
when it is known that these players will subject themselves to the same threat 
of injury, albeit at an amateur level.208  With the average career being around 
3.5 years,209 the shortest of any major North American professional sport, the 
rule accomplishes one thing—prolonging the chance of injury without freely 
negotiated compensation, ensuring that “the cream [of NFL talent] will rise 
to the top.”210 
While it is the NFL Players Association’s (“NFLPA”) duty to seek 
the best deal for NFL players, it is far-fetched to still believe—with the 
rookie salary amendments—that the “eligibility rules . . . have tangible 
effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players.”211  The 
court in Clarett v. NCAA (“Clarett II”)212 opined that “the complex scheme 
by which individual salaries in the NFL . . . was built around the 
longstanding restraint on the market for entering players imposed by the 
205. Id. 
206. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132. 
207. See id. at 131–34. 
208. See id. at 129. 
209. Schwartz, supra note 12. 
210. See id.; Chris Vannini, David Shaw:  A College Coach’s No. 1 Job is NOT 
to Get Players to the NFL, COACHINGSEARCH.COM (Apr. 16, 2016), 
http://www.coachingsearch.com/article?a=David-Shaw-A-college-coachs-No1-job-is-NOT-
to-get-players-to-the-NFL. 
211. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140. 
212. 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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eligibility rules and the related expectations about the average career length 
of NFL players.”213 
The court later states, “by reducing competition in the market for 
entering players, the eligibility rules also affect[ed] the job security of 
veteran players.”214  In a dangerous sport where job security and health are so 
deeply intertwined that the average career span is shorter than the average 
contract length for a rookie player,215 this problem seems de minimis.216  The 
NFL has the largest roster size of the major professional sports, yet feels 
compelled to impose the strictest draft eligibility rules to prevent younger 
players from securing jobs seemingly meant for veterans.217  “[I]t is unlikely 
that such raiding would destroy college football . . . since there are relatively 
few athletes who are capable of playing professional football without the 
benefit of . . . college competition.”218 
Furthermore, the NFL has taken less restrictive alternative steps that 
have directly addressed job security concerns of veteran players in the 
league.219  In the latest collective bargaining agreement, the players’ union 
and the league agreed to modify rookie contracts by predetermining the 
contract amount for each draft pick.220  “[T]he NFLPA negotiating team, led 
by veterans who were frustrated with rookies entering the league and making 
more than proven players, was only too happy to shift funds to established 
guys.”221  Through this amendment, veteran players gained more leverage in 
contract negotiations for their proven skills, rather than have unproven 
rookies set an inflated market price for their position.222 
213. Id. at 140. 
214. Id. 
215. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434, 438 n.284; Cork 
Gaines, Here’s How Much Money Players Lose When They Fall in the NFL Draft, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-draft-contract-values-
2016-4.  Rookies generally sign a four-year contract.  Gaines, supra. 
216. See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 44, at 434. 
217. Id. at 407. 
218. Id. at 433; see also Legwold, supra note 19. 
219. See Andrew Brandt, The New Age of Rookie Contract Negotiations, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: MMQB (May 22, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/05/22/nfl-rookie-
contract-negotiations. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See John Czarnecki, Rookie Cap Biggest Win from New CBA, FOX SPORTS 
(July 27, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/NFL-rookie-salary-cap-
biggest-win-from-new-CBA-less-risk-for-owners-072711.  “The new collective bargaining 
agreement somewhat changes what had become a ridiculous system in which a rookie, an 
unproven professional, often was suddenly making more money than most of his veteran 
teammates, even Pro Bowl selections.”  Id. 
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Conversely, the NFL has taken measures that have proven to be 
detrimental to players’ job security.223  NFL Europe lasted for sixteen years, 
operating as the NFL’s development league, prior to the NFL terminating the 
league in 2007.224  On a roster, where more than twenty players are 
considered reserves, it is a constant battle to stay employed.225  The defunct 
development league helped to develop talents in ways unobtainable with the 
current teams.226  Due to player safety concerns, offseason training activities 
have been reduced,227 causing coaches to focus more on contributing players 
rather than developing depth on their roster.228  NFL Europe, though 
costly,229 allowed players on the fringe of making an NFL roster to gain 
valuable practice opportunities and experience, which certainly enhanced 
their prospects of securing and maintaining a job in the NFL.230  From a 
business perspective, the league simply closed NFL Europe to maximize 
profits,231 thanks, in part, to the free farm system that is college football.232  It 
can certainly be argued that the draft eligibility rule does not primarily 
223. See Sean Keeler, ‘You Didn’t Play to Get Rich’:  What Killed NFL 
Europe?, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jun/23/you-didnt-play-to-get-rich-what-killed-nfl-
europe. 
224. Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/sports/29iht-nfl.4.6417232.html. 
225. See Marc Lillibridge, The Anatomy of a 53-Man Roster in the NFL, 
BLEACHER REP. (May 16, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1640782-the-anatomy-of-
a-53-man-roster-in-the-nfl; Released? Waived? Practice Squad?  An NFL Roster Moves 
Primer, FOX SPORTS (Sept. 2, 2016, 5:38 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/released-
waived-practice-squad-an-nfl-roster-moves-primer-090216; Keeler, supra note 223. 
226. See Keeler, supra note 223. 
227. Judy Battista, Players Like Camp Restrictions; They’re Growing on 
Coaches, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, at B8. 
228. See id. 
229. Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 224. 
“The league was reportedly losing about [thirty] million a season.”  Id.  But see Total Revenue 
of all National Football League Teams from 2001 to 2015 (in Billion U. S. Dollars), 
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/193457/total-league-revenue-of-the-nfl-since-
2005/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).  In 2007, when NFL Europe closed, league posted revenue of 
7.09 billion.  Id.  Meaning that an expense of 30 million still equated to less than 1% of their 
revenue.  See id. 
230. See Keeler, supra note 223.  “The value [of NFL Europe] was just in 
terms of [the fact] guys that are on the lower end of the roster, you [a]re not getting much 
better in OTAs.  You [a]re not getting much better, honestly, in camps.”  Id. (alteration in 
original). 
231. See Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 
224.  “Goodell said it was time to develop a new international strategy, describing the move to 
fold NFL Europa as the best business decision.”  Id.; Keeler, supra note 223. 
232. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 n.181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Keeler, supra note 223; see also Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes 
European League, supra note 224. 
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/4
2017] INTENTIONAL GROUNDING 293 
address a mandatory bargaining subject, instead acting as a market barrier for 
a certain population of players which forces them to bargain their services 
for a scholarship.233 
2. Rule of Reason Application to Draft Eligibility Rules
Despite the unsuccessful challenge to the eligibility rules in Clarett I, 
courts have found that similar entry barriers violated the antitrust laws.234  
Since the NFL has been recognized as a monopoly controlling the market for 
football players’ services,235 it is pertinent to ensure that their practices are 
not unreasonable restraints on the market for these players’ services.236 
a. Substantial Adverse Effect on Competition Within the Market
The Supreme Court of the United States has allowed an intermediate 
inquiry, known as quick-look, if the conduct is a naked restriction.237  They 
explained that a quick-look analysis, under the rule of reason, is appropriate 
where “the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be 
ascertained,” and “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect.”238 
As previously addressed, the market is clearly for football players’ 
services.239  The market for professional football players and college football 
players is illusory, as the players providing this labor market involuntarily 
submit to the mandatory pre-requisite that they provide services as a college 
football player prior to becoming a professional.240  Certainly, few players 
can make the jump from the high school rank to the pros,241 but they should 
be afforded the right to pursue their profession free of unreasonable 
obstructions.242  The only alternative to college football that would provide 
monetary compensation is the minuscule Arena Football League (“AFL”).243  
233. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02. 
234. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401–02.  But see Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 
F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
235. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407; Janofsky, supra note 135. 
236. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02. 
237. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999). 
238. Id. at 770. 
239. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401–02. 
240. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141; Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 401, 409 n.185. 
241. Legwold, supra note 19. 
242. See id. 
243. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, NEGOTIATED BY AND
BETWEEN ARENA FOOTBALL ONE, LLC AND ARENA FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS UNION 13 
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Based on the pay,244 it seems unfeasible to choose this path given the risk of 
injury and the fact that the game itself is different than the NFL style of 
play.245 
In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,246 the court 
considered an NBA bylaw that restricted eligibility to players who were at 
least four years removed from the date of their high school graduation an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.247  Since then, the NBA has amended their 
draft eligibility rules to once again prevent immediate eligibility to high 
school graduates, albeit a reasonable restraint of only one year.248  Similar 
age-based restrictions have been struck down in professional hockey.249  
Therefore, it is evident that the restriction constitutes a naked restriction that 
has the anticompetitive effect of excluding players’ ability to render their 
services to the NFL.250 
b. Challenged Conduct Promotes Competition
The Clarett I case provides the NFL’s procompetitive justifications 
for the rule: 
The purposes of the eligibility rule include [1] protecting younger 
and/or less experienced players—that is, players who are less 
mature physically and psychologically—from heightened risks of 
injury in NFL games; [2] protecting the NFL’s entertainment 
product from the adverse consequences associated with such 
injuries; [3] protecting the NFL clubs from the costs and potential 
(Aug. 10, 2012), www.aflpu.org/resources/ALFPU+AFL+CBA+2012.pdf; Sharks to Host 
Open Tryout in Georgia, ARENAFOOTBALL.COM (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.arenafootball.com/sports/a-footbl/spec-rel/120915aad.html. 
244. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 239, at 13.  AFL 
salary range for veteran/rookie, $17,220–$18,375, over a twenty-one-game schedule, based on 
fixed salary.  Id. 
245. See Matt Bonesteel, Movement to Eliminate Kickoffs in College Football 
Reportedly Gaining Steam, WASH. POST (July 18, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/07/18/movement-to-eliminate-
kickoffs-in-college-football-reportedly-gaining-steam/. 
246. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
247. Id. at 1054. 
248. NBA Draft Rules, supra note 5. 
249. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317, 1320–21 (D. 
Conn. 1977) (preliminarily enjoining a rule declaring players younger than twenty ineligible 
for the hockey league draft because it was an illegal “group boycott, or a concerted refusal to 
deal, [which] has been long and consistently classified as a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act”). 
250. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321. 
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liability entailed by such injuries; and [4] protecting from injury 
and self-abuse other adolescents who would over-train—and use 
steroids—in the misguided hope of developing prematurely the 
strength and speed required to play in the NFL.251 
While the NFL wants to ensure the health of the younger players, the 
first and fourth justifications are misguided attempts to feign caring for 
players’ health, because it simply does not want to have the players injured at 
its expense.252  These players face the same threat of injury at the collegiate 
level.253  Under this notion, the NCAA should not allow true freshmen to 
play against upperclassmen who have completed at least a year of a semi-
professional training regimen.254  This does not occur because of the 
numerous opportunities high school prospects have to perfect their craft.255  
The temptation of steroid use and overtraining exists, regardless of this rule, 
as prep players are exposed to the pressures of reaching the exclusive 
collegiate level to continue their aspirations of becoming a professional.256  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that 
justifications offered under the rule of reason may be considered only to the 
extent that they tend to show that “the challenged restraint enhances 
competition.”257  Consequently, the first and fourth justifications hoping to 
protect younger players’ wellbeing do not promote competition.258  The 
second explanation prescribes that by “limiting the occurrence of player 
injuries, [the rule] maintains the high quality of its entertainment product 
and, thus, presumably enables the League to better compete with other 
providers of sports entertainment such as other professional sports leagues or 
amateur football.”259  Here, the league incorrectly assumes the validity of the 
rule simply because it provides competition in a market—sports 
entertainment—other than the market—football players’ service—in which 
251. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
252. See id. at 408, 408 n.181. 
253. See Bonesteel, supra note 245. 
254. See id.  “NCAA moved kickoffs to the [thirty-five] yard line,” similar to 
the NFL’s kickoff amendment in lieu of player safety concerns.  Id. 
255. See Edwin Weathersby, Top 10 Camps Where College Football Recruits 
Get Noticed, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/2005928-top-10-camps-where-college-football-
recruits-get-noticed/page/9. 
256. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 20, at art. 16 § 31.2.3.4. 
Percentage of high school football players to play in NCAA is 6.7%.  NCAA RESEARCH, 
supra note 1. 
257. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984); Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.182. 
258. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
259. Id. at 409. 
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the rule has an anticompetitive effect.260  Lastly, the NFL asserts that the rule 
shields its teams from these injury-related costs.261  Cost reduction, alone, is 
not considered a legitimate procompetitive justification;262 rather, it is a 
component of a bargain that is “favorably affected by [competition].”263  
Based on the reasons provided, it seems that the NFL has not offered any 
strong justifications that the rule promotes competition in the market for 
football players’ services.264 
IV. CONCLUSION
The NCAA and NFL are the two biggest providers of American 
football entertainment.265  There is an undeniable nexus between these 
organizations, in that one serves as the de facto development league for the 
other.266  Both have implemented practices that unreasonably restrain this 
shared labor market to their economic benefit.267 
The NFL identified that they are direct competitors in the sports 
entertainment market with amateur football.268 
260. See id. at 408–09, 409 n.185. 
[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the 
freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster.  Implicit in such freedom is the notion 
that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because 
certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote 
greater competition in a more important sector of the economy. 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
261. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
262. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 
1998).  “[C]ost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification.”  Id. 
263. Id.; see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 
423 (1990). 
[T]he ‘Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices but, also, better goods and services.’  This judgment 
‘recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—
and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to 
select among alternative offers.’ 
FTC, 493 U.S. at 423 (citation omitted). 
264. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408–10.  Let it be noted that the only case 
to analyze the procompetitive justifications of the modern draft eligibility rule held that “the 
League . . . failed to offer any legitimate procompetitive justifications for the Rule.”  Id. at 
409. 
265. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409, n.185. 
266. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
267. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
268. Id. 
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The conspiracy or agreement to fix prices or to rig bids is the key 
element of a Sherman Act criminal case.  In effect, the conspiracy 
must comprise [of] an agreement, understanding or meeting of the 
minds between at least two competitors or potential competitors, 
for the purpose or with the effect of unreasonably restraining 
trade.269 
More damning is the fact that the NFL attempted to justify their draft 
eligibility rule by “excluding the most talented college players from the NFL, 
[to sustain] ‘the NCAA’s ability to compete in the entertainment market.’”270  
With the dissolution of NFL Europe, it is apparent that the NFL has a keen 
interest in the viability of its free farm system.271  Unfortunately, this is in 
direct conflict with the precedent established in United States v. Topco 
Associates, Incorporated,272 that competition in one market—football players 
services—may not be suppressed in favor for another market—entertainment 
market.273  Additionally, the NCAA has further impacted the restraints on 
football players’ services by promoting amateurism rules that render any 
hopeful professional player an indentured servant for a minimum of three 
years.274 
Since the NCAA has now allowed for student-athletes to receive 
scholarships capped at the full cost of attendance,275 it seems that any further 
compensation may contradict the idea of amateurism.276  With perpetual 
269. Antitrust Resource Manual:  Elements of the Offense, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resource-manual-7-elements-offense (last updated Oct. 
2011). 
270. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409 n.185. 
271. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); 
Football:  After 16 Years, NFL Closes European League, supra note 220; Mike Florio, 
Fournette Definitely Should Take a Year off in 2016, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:33 AM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/09/30/fournette-definitely-should-take-a-year-off-
in-2016/. 
272. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
273. Id. at 610. 
274. See Daniel Roberts, Does the NCAA Make Its Money from Indentured 
Servants?, YAHOO: FIN. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-the-ncaa-make-
its-money-from-indentured-servants-184409356.html. 
[T]he athletes are promised an education, but in fact [do not] get the same one their 
fellow students get because they devote the vast majority of their time to their sport.  
Second, the NCAA’s strict rules around amateurism bring down harsh punishments 
on athletes for even the tiniest of infractions . . . .  The third problem is the big 
money the NCAA sees, while its athletes see none of it.  “The NCAA is running a 
cartel,” Nocera rails, “where everybody gets rich except the labor force.”  He likens 
NCAA athletes to indentured servants. 
Id. 
275. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
276. See id. at 1058; Novy, supra note 163, at 229. 
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yearly revenue increases,277 this appears to be a temporary solution to an 
aspect of a larger problem.278  Schools will continue to benefit financially 
from the services provided by football players at a fixed cost of attendance, 
which ensurs unfathomable profit margins.279  The state of college sports will 
continue to have improper benefits scandals, ironically, due to the collusion 
by the NFL and NCAA to promote the importance of college.280  As students 
are forced to attend class each day and go through the rigors of being a 
college athlete, they realize the limited earning potential of their fragile 
careers.281  With the popularity of the sport being at an all-time high, student-
athletes see the earnings that their respective programs gross as a result of 
their hard work.282  Yet they face unreasonable restrictions that, if violated, 
could effectively end their ability to earn a living from their skill before it 
ever materialized.283  This greedy practice has led sports pundits to call for 
star college players to sit-out seasons to remain healthy and keep their 
professional aspirations intact.284  However, it would take a selfless 
individual to do so, because this is a daunting task to place on a nineteen or 
twenty year old who does not want to offend the establishment.285  This 
displays the overwhelming amount of power these two entities possess.286 
Some students choose to attend college to obtain marketable skills 
that will benefit them in their career.287  Although the likelihood of reaching 
the professional level is low,288 some football players only want to acquire 
277. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 30.  Texas A&M’s 2014 revenue 
increased by $73,133,004 in comparison to the previous year.  Id. 
278. See Novy, supra note 163, at 230. 
279. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054–55; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
280. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1054.  “[T]he NFL has required aspiring 
professional football players to wait a sufficient period of time after graduating high school to 
accommodate and encourage college attendance before entering the NFL draft.”  Clarett v. 
Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).  This statement makes the rule seem 
far less stringent than it actually is.  See id.  It appears as though football players are truly 
given a choice to either play at the collegiate level in exchange for only a college education or 
become a professional.  See id.  Since there is no realistic alternative to college, they are 
forced to accept the only option on the table.  Id. 
281. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; Novy, supra note 163, at 229–30. 
282. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Berkowitz et al., supra note 30. 
283. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; Florio, supra note 271. 
284. Florio, supra note 271.  The position Fournette plays, running back, has 
the second shortest average career span, at only two and a half years.  Rob Arthur, The 
Shrinking Shelf Life of NFL Players, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-shrinking-
shelf-life-of-nfl-players-1456694959 (last updated Feb. 29, 2016, 12:42 AM). 
285. See Florio, supra note 271. 
286. See id. 
287. Id. 
288. See NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 1. 
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marketable skills that will benefit them in their professional careers.289  In 
Denver Rockets, the court stated, “[p]rofessional basketball is the only trade 
in which Haywood can employ his unusual talents and skills.  Unless 
Haywood plays professional basketball, those skills and talents will 
depreciate.”290  Taking the same approach in regards to football players, 
professional football is the only trade in which players can employ their 
talents and skills.291  Though some players have no desire to obtain a college 
education, the NFL sees fit to force it upon them—possibly depreciating a 
players’ talent and worth at that players’ expense.292  Unlike other careers, 
where certain skills transcend across a variety of jobs giving an individual 
several options to establish a career path, the unique skill of a football player 
is forced down the same beaten path.293  Even in other professional sports, 
players are afforded various options into the labor market.294  This liberty 
would certainly help improve the amateur image that the NCAA tries so 
vehemently to uphold because athletes would be given a true choice to attend 
school for the benefit of an education rather than begin their professional 
careers.295 
It is unfortunate that arguably the most violent sport is controlled by 
two entities that continually exploit the skills of football players.296  It is 
almost a guarantee that a football player will suffer some type of injury prior 
to embarking on their professional career.297  The limits placed on these 
individuals ensures that both the NCAA and NFL can milk a player for six or 
seven years of labor while only paying compensation, at an equitable rate,298 
for half that time.299  The NFL gets a player that is possibly already in their 
289. See Florio, supra note 271. 
290. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971). 
291. See Glauber, supra note 95. 
292. Thamel, supra note 6, at 42. 
293. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Glauber, supra note 95. 
294. MLB Draft Rules, supra note 7.  A baseball prospect can turn professional 
immediately after graduating from high school or after their junior college season.  Id.  If 
prospects elect to go to junior or community college, they can declare for the draft regardless 
of time spent in school.  Id.  Basketball prospects can play a season overseas to avoid college 
and immediately turn professional once graduating high school.  See Thamel, supra note 6. 
295. Thamel, supra note 6; see also Roberts, supra note 274. 
296. See Viera, supra note 20, at D1. 
297. See id. 
298. See Soffian, supra note 33; Underwood, supra note 1, at 24.  Until 2015, a 
majority of school scholarships were year-to-year and renewable at the school’s discretion. 
Soffian, supra note 33.  Ironically, the athlete’s performance on the field could determine 
whether he remained a student.  Id. 
299. Underwood, supra note 1, at 24. 
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prime without spending a dime to develop them, while the NCAA just 
milked that cash cow and maybe did not even have to pay for a fourth year of 
schooling.300  The average NFL career span shows the sacredness of every 
snap in a player’s careermeaning that a lot of players may not be able to 
maximize their earnings because the NFL would of course devalue them as 
damaged goods.301  Yes, there are superstar football players being paid 
boatloads of cash, but there are only a few of these players on every team 
roster.302  For a majority, lasting past their rookie contract is a blessing and 
they are willing to take what a NFL team deems is their value.303  Older 
players commanding a higher veteran minimum salary are essentially ushered 
out of the league because they are considered to have too much wear and 
tear on their bodies.304  It is a tragedy to limit these players’ talents as their 
value diminishes with each hit.305 
Pending the conclusion of O’Bannon, the NCAA’s amateurism rules 
may receive another chink in its armor.306  However, hopes are that this 
Comment has displayed the collusive practices that the NCAA and NFL have 
engaged in to effectively control the labor market for all football players’ 
services.307  The NFL and NCAA have a symbiotic relationship in that the 
League’s eligibility rule provides a steady flow of talent to colleges—whom 
fatten their wallets from this talent—while colleges provide the best 
developed talent at no cost to the league.308  Forget the Fail Mary or the 
Immaculate Reception, this arrangement between the NCAA and NFL is the 
biggest logic-defying play in the sport’s history.309  There’s just one problem:  
There is a flag.310 
300. See id. 
301. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
302. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
303. See Gaines, supra note 215; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
304. Brandt, supra note 215. 
305. See Breslow, supra note 16. 
306. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1062–63 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3139 (Oct. 3, 2016). 
307. Id.; Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408–09 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Janofsky, supra note 135. 
308. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409; Underwood, supra note 1, at 22. 
309. John McTigue, MNF Moments, No. 1:  The Fail Mary, ESPN.COM (Sept. 
8, 2014), http://www.espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/138835/mnf-moments-no-1-the-
fail-mary; see also Gary Meyers, Top 10 Greatest Plays in NFL History:  From the 
Immaculate Reception to John Elway’s Helicopter Ride, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 9 2015, 
8:51 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/top-10-greatest-plays-nfl-history-
article-1.2354371.  During a brief NFL referee lockout, a replacement referee notoriously 
incorrectly declared an interception a touchdown to give the Seattle Seahawks an improbable 
win over the Green Bay Packers.  McTigue, supra. 
Just [twenty-two] seconds remained and [the Steelers] trailed the Raiders 7–6 in the 
divisional round of the playoffs.  Steelers owner Art Rooney was already on his 
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